
Elevated firewall-rule deletion commands do not establish an outcome
Two elevated netsh processes invoked commands to delete rules named `upWire` and `wire`, but the records do not show whether either rule existed or was removed. A separately profiled `wire` executable shares the upWire file’s signing certificate and has a reported service location, making the names worth investigating without proving which program initiated the commands.
Two elevated Windows processes were launched with commands to delete firewall rules named upWire and wire. The events appear in the sandbox findings associated with an upWire executable, but their immediate parent is cmd.exe, not that executable. That distinction frames the central question: do these records show a program interfering with firewall protection, or software managing rules associated with its own components?
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