
Media-named file copied to command script as renamed AutoIt runs
An installer sample’s recorded parent command copies `Listen.mpeg` to a `.cmd` file and invokes it; a created process named `As.com` carries AutoIt executable metadata. A separate memory extraction identifies eight configured HTTPS C2 URLs, several of whose hosts also appear in sample-associated DNS detections. The records do not establish successful C2 sessions or data theft.
A process named As.com appears in an installer sample’s analysis with a different identity in its executable metadata: AutoIt3.exe. Its recorded parent command copies Listen.mpeg to Listen.mpeg.cmd and invokes the resulting command file. That mismatch raises the central question in this case: what is the package actually arranging to execute, and where is it configured to communicate? CTX Threat Intelligence’s records support two substantial findings.
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